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1. Overview 
Developed countries have long given non-reciprocal (unilateral) trade preferences to the 
various developing countries (see Heron, 2019; Hoekman and Prowse, 2005). In 1968, the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) suggested a Generalised 
Scheme of Preferences (GSP) in which developed countries could offer non-reciprocal trade 
concessions to ‘all’ developing countries, not only to the ‘former colonies’. Ever since, the 
member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
have adopted a number of non-reciprocal preferential access schemes, in addition to an ever-
expanding set of bilateral and regional (non-reciprocal) trade liberalisation schemes. Such 
arrangements include national GSP programmes; GSP-plus programmes for the least developed 
countries (LDCs) – such as the European Union’s (EU's) Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative; 
and special provisions for subsets of developing countries like the United States African Growth 
and Opportunities Act (AGOA) (Hoekman and Prowse, 2005; Heron, 2019). 
Preference erosion (i.e. the trade losses arising from liberalisation in other countries) is a 
major problem for many developing countries, often leading to appeals by their diplomats 
and trade negotiators. For instance, most African nations have benefited from trade preference 
systems such as AGOA and EBA. Nevertheless, the elimination of tariffs, which is a key goal of 
international trade negotiations, would reduce the advantages of these preferences (Alpert, 2005; 
Kopp et al., 2016; Vickers, 2019). 
Before setting new international trade arrangements and eliminating tariffs on imported 
goods (i.e. following Brexit), the UK should assess the impact on developing 
countries. Most developing countries typically enjoy preferential access to the UK market 
through GSP or EBA schemes. The UK Government has indicated that it wishes, in principle, to 
preserve such schemes, although they may differ from those of the EU. Eliminating the most-
favoured-nation (MFN) tariffs on products would undermine the preferences that developing 
countries currently enjoy, which could be detrimental to these countries and to key sectors within 
those countries. This possible unintended impact on developing countries further demonstrates 
that trade policy should be consistent with other policy/diplomatic objectives of the UK, e.g. UK’s 
overall foreign policy priorities and obligations to developing countries (UKTPO, 2020; Vickers, 
2019). 
Many developing countries (particularly non-LDCs)1 covered by current trade agreements 
will find that market access to the UK will be restricted after Brexit (i.e. leading to possible 
complaints and diplomatic disputes). In this regard, there are several historical examples that 
may offer some illustration on tariff/quota disputes, particularly linked to preference erosion and 
the most-favoured-nation treatment (see Annex for more details): 
                                                   
1 The UK has been a member of free trade agreements (FTAs) with developing countries, including Vietnam, 
Central America and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with some African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries (i.e. while being part of the EU). Some of these countries, in particular some EPA members, have the 
UK as their main destination for exports of goods (e.g. Kenya) or services (e.g. the Caribbean). They are 
expected to have duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) market access under the preferential regime for the LDCs 
(Mendez-Parra, 2016). On the basis of the territoriality clause of the EPAs, these FTAs apply exclusively to the 
territory of the EU (Mendez-Parra, 2016). 
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 Complaint by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the United States against 
European Communities regarding bananas imports from third countries – particularly 
about a more favourable quota level for African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 
(ACP). 
 Complaint by India against European Communities regarding products imported from 
Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru and Venezuela benefiting from the ‘Drug Arrangements’ through 
the EC GSP scheme – thus, putting India at a disadvantage. 
 Complaint by European Communities, Japan, and the United States against Indonesia 
regarding the automotive industry. It was noted that Indonesia violated the MFN 
treatment since the duty and sales tax exemptions given to Korean imported motor 
vehicles (and vehicle parts) were not given unconditionally to other WTO members. 
Although the UK may have (diplomatic and economic) interest in re-negotiating current 
free trade agreements (FTAs), many developing countries will not be on the priority list of 
partners to be negotiated with, particularly at a time when the UK’s trade negotiators and 
diplomats are going to be busy (Lydgate et al, 2016). This suggests that a kind of transitional 
arrangement may be needed to avoid disruption (Rollo, 2016). Mendez-Parra (2016) notes that 
the UK's post-Brexit transitional provisions will need to depend more on diplomacy to 
avoid challenges for other World Trade Organisation (WTO) members. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there is a limited evidence base (e.g. academic studies) 
around the diplomatic impacts of (MFN related) tariff changes. Much of the evidence in the area 
focuses on the economic effects of tariff changes and preference erosion – rather than on 
diplomatic or political impacts. The evidence base narrows further when limited to the effect on 
developing countries. Thus, this rapid evidence review relies on a limited number of key 
literatures – especially taking advantage of the growth in the literature around Doha 
Development Round (or Doha Development Agenda (DDA)) in the 2000s. It must be noted that 
specific trade figures (e.g. estimates of preference margins) reported in older sources may be 
less accurate now. However, they convey still relevant dynamics around trade politics and 
diplomacy between countries. To complement the key (older) sources, the review also looks at 
different types of recent relevant literature – including reports issued by different international 
development agencies, commentaries by scholars and some academic publications. 
The report is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
clause and the diplomatic frictions linked to it. Specifically, it first discusses the 
diplomatic/political concerns of developing countries linked to MFN tariff changes and then how 
preference erosion affects developing countries. Section 3 briefly discusses how post-Brexit UK’s 
MFN tariff structure could potentially impact developing countries. In this regard, the section first 
assesses UK’s potential MFN policy (post-Brexit) towards developing countries and then about 
the resulting preference erosion and its likely diplomatic impacts. Section 4 draws lessons on 
historical MFN policies of Australia, the EU and the US – and how the changes in tariff policy led 
to preference erosion in developing countries, at times resulting in some complaints and 
diplomatic rows. However, it must be noted again that much of the analysis of the impacts of tariff 
changes in these countries is also economic. Diplomatic impacts are often briefly mentioned or 
simply implied (i.e. to settle the complaints of countries). Finally, the Annexe section provides 
some useful examples of notable MFN tariff disputes handled by the WTO’s Appellate Body and 
the WTO Panel since the 1990s. 
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2. Most-favoured-nation (MFN) and Diplomatic Frictions  
Diplomatic (or Political) Concerns of Developing Countries Linked 
to MFN Tariff Changes 
The multilateral trade system depends on the principle of non-discrimination. The most-
favoured-nation clause2 (symbolised in article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)) was the vital principle for a system that emerged in the post–World War II era, largely in 
reaction to the folly of protectionism and managed trade, which exacerbated the global economic 
depression of the 1930s. However, from its origins, the GATT has allowed exemptions from the 
MFN rule in the case of reciprocal preferential trade agreements. It also enables the giving of 
unilateral (non-reciprocal) preferences to developing countries (Hoekman et al., 2008; Heron, 
2019; Vickers, 2019). 
Unilateral preferences given by member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) create an unavoidable (diplomatic/political) pressure 
between “more preferred” developing economies (e.g. typically beneficiaries from pre-
existing colonial regimes) and other developing countries concerning the impacts of MFN 
liberalisation by preference-granting countries. Worries about preference erosion were one 
of the key points of dispute in the negotiations of the Doha Development Agenda (Hoekman et 
al., 2008; Efstathopoulos, 2012; Trommer, 2017; Mahrenbach and Shaw, 2019). When the Doha 
Round was launched, ministers placed development at the centre of the discussion. They 
stressed that they “seek to place developing countries’ needs and interests at the heart of the 
Work Programme adopted in this Declaration.” They also added that they “shall continue to make 
positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least-developed 
among them, secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs of their 
economic development. In this context, enhanced market access, balanced rules, and well-
targeted, sustainably financed technical assistance and capacity-building programmes have 
important roles to play.” (WTO, 2020) 
However, concerns of preference erosion had been an issue long before the Doha Round 
(i.e. the latest round of trade negotiations between the WTO members).3 In the 1970s, for 
example, the effect of the Tokyo Round of liberalisation on the benefits derived by developing 
countries from the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) was widely discussed (e.g. Ahmad, 
1977). Although preference erosion is a long-standing concern for many developing countries, 
the scope and coverage of unilateral preferential regimes have increased considerably over the 
years, particularly for the least developed countries (LDCs). In the past, concerns about erosion 
                                                   
2 The ‘UK in a Changing Europe’ has defines the ‘most-favoured nation’ principle of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) as implying that “WTO members cannot discriminate between their trading partners and must, with a few 
exceptions, offer access to their market on the same terms for all WTO members. It means that a favour offered 
to one country must be offered to all. However, members can go further and offer better trading terms to some 
countries if, for example, they agree a free trade agreement or they give developing countries better terms.” (UK 
and EU, 2020)  
3 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm 
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have not been a strong constraint on the MFN-based reforms of the GATT (now the WTO) as 
GSP programs typically gave some tariff reductions and preferential quotas but did not provide 
duty-free or quota-free access. Thus, even if the MFN rates were lowered, it was possible to 
retain a given preference margin by reducing the preferential tariff or by widening the coverage of 
the scheme. But contemporary programs like the EU’s EBA or the U.S. AGOA include duty-free 
and quota-free access for almost all products and, thus, any reductions in MFN tariffs lower the 
preference margin. It is, hence, not startling that preference erosion has garnered considerable 
diplomatic attention in the WTO multilateral negotiations (Hoekman et al., 2008; see also Shaw 
et al., 2019). 
As discussed in Hoekman and Özden (2005), early assessments of preferential regimes 
raised doubts as to whether preferences were an effective way to help developing 
countries. It was noted that producers in the beneficiary countries had to be able to compete 
with domestic producers in the donor country as well as other exporters. Subject to this 
discussion was the extent to which the 5 to 7% preference margin would make a significant 
difference.4 In addition, diplomats and trade experts noted that even in sectors where 
preferences would make a difference, they could lead to specialisation in sectors where the 
beneficiary country did not have an inherent comparative advantage; this outcome, in turn, would 
lead to socially wasteful investment (Hoekman et al., 2008). 
Other concerns included the potential diplomatic or political tension between the 
beneficiary and excluded countries, administrative costs such as rules of origin, and the 
possibility that preferences would reduce incentives for global MFN liberalisation as 
beneficiary countries became concerned about the deterioration of preference margins. A 
more general concern was the politicisation (i.e. the addition of diplomatic objectives) of trade 
policy in so far as donor countries used preferences 'to reward and punish' recipients for their 
'behaviour and performance' in other non-economic areas (Hoekman et al., 2008; Vickers, 2019; 
WTO, 2018; WTO, 2013). 
GSP and other unilateral preferences made available by the United States and the EU 
often attached side conditions (e.g. certain diplomatic, political, economic, social, and/or 
environmental objectives) that, although aimed at improving conditions in those 
countries, are potentially costly to the recipient developing country. As such, these 
unilateral preferences are not free to developing countries. Furthermore, Jackson (1997) notes 
that the GSP experience in the GATT system has been that, for a number of reasons, 
the preference giving states (i.e. industrialised economies) often fall victim to the temptation of 
using preferential systems as part of 'diplomatic bargaining chips' (Jackson, 1997). This was 
possible partly because the GSP-extended preferences are privileges rather than enforceable 
rights (UNCTAD, 2016; Heron, 2019).  
Preference giving countries, thus, may suspend preferences in a GATT-legal manner, 
which is without GATT-sanctioned retribution. The USA and the E.U. In exchange for 
cooperation on various non-trade issues such as labour, the environment, drug trafficking and 
intellectual property, offer explicit reductions in trade barriers. Instances of these include the 
                                                   
4 The GSP included preferences, not duty-free and quota-free access of the type currently granted to the LDCs 
by many OECD countries 
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Eastern European and Mediterranean agreements signed by the E.U.; US agreements with 
Jordan, Mexico and other Latin American and Caribbean countries; and preferential treatment 
that the E.U. and the United States extends over GSP to most developing countries (Limao and 
Olarreaga, 2006; Heron, 2019). 
The legitimacy of some of the extra preferences granted just to sub-groups of developing 
countries has been contested in the WTO. For example, India has questioned the 
preferences of the EU. grants for cooperation on drugs to Pakistan and other countries. 
The preference practice is still common, nevertheless. Besides that, even if unilateral schemes 
are substituted by preferential trade agreements (PTAs) requiring a reduction in the protection of 
the small country, compliance with the side conditions will continue to play a vital role in the 
desire of the developed country to pursue such agreements (Limao and Olarreaga, 2006; see 
also WTO, 2018; and Annex section in this report). 
Trade preferences are essential to continued efforts to negotiate further multilateral trade 
liberalisation in the context of the WTO Doha Round of negotiations. Middle-income 
countries are greatly worried about the discrimination they face in OECD markets as a 
result of better access to these markets, both for other industrialised nations – as a result 
of free trade agreements – and for poorer or "more preferred" developing countries. LDCs 
and non-LDC African, Caribbean and Pacific countries are worried that the liberalisation of trade 
based on broad MFN tariffs and the elimination of trade-distorting policies in agriculture by OECD 
countries will undermine the value of their current preferential access (Hoekman and Prowse, 
2005; Mendez-Parra, 2017; Heron, 2019). 
 
Preference Erosion and Developing Countries 
Trade preferences entail a blend of benefits for preferential exporters but may end up 
costing third-country exporters and potential losses for the importing country. Only when 
the (more) preferred nation is small, in the sense that it does not impact the internal price of the 
importing country, will there be no negative impact on third-country competitors. In such cases, 
preferences only generate trade (i.e. expands imports) to the disadvantage of local suppliers in 
the preference-giving nation, but not of other foreign suppliers, who continue to see the same 
price (Hoekman and Prowse, 2005; Mendez-Parra, 2017; WTO, 2018). 
Preference erosion entails the reallocation of benefits from those with the greatest 
preferences to those facing punitive tariffs. Those faced with greater tariffs will obtain an 
export surplus, while the preferential suppliers will encounter a decline in demand for their 
exports, resulting in a partial, albeit generally incomplete, loss of benefits from the initial 
preference scheme. The loss is not complete since the preferences include, in part, the 
advantages of the original tariff-ridden balance resulting from a non-discriminatory tariff cuts by 
the importer. Consequently, preference erosion usually results in a partial, and not full, loss of the 
initial benefits of the preference scheme (Hoekman and Prowse, 2005; see also WTO, 2018). 
Trade reforms by recipient nations and emerging market countries that do not give 
preferential access have the potential to greatly mitigate the negative effects of 
preference erosion. When assessing the magnitude of the erosion effects, much will rely not 
only on the depth of liberalisation by preference giving countries (e.g. the extent to which sectors 
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such as sugar, beef and rice are opened up in OECD economies) but also on what other 
countries are doing. Much also depends on whether developing countries profiting from 
preferential access utilise schemes to strengthen the competitiveness and productivity of their 
enterprises and farmers. Development assistance can play a significant role in this 
area (Hoekman and Prowse, 2005; Mendez-Parra, 2017; WTO, 2020).   
A clear focus on tackling erosion concerns will help to eliminate an instrument that is 
costly to the international trading system. Preferences manipulate international trade and 
have been the causes for the multiplication of regional trade agreements. This is because 
excluded (i.e. less preferred) nations are compelled to negotiate equivalent access on a 
reciprocal basis with major preference-granting countries. In the long term, the continued 
deepening of preferential trade arrangements (e.g. the EU Economic Partnership 
Agreements) may further exacerbate the status quo bias, implying that concerns of preference 
erosion by diplomats and trade negotiators may become even more of a constraint in concluding 
a multilateral trade rounds (Hoekman and Prowse, 2005; WTO, 2013). 
For tariff preferences to have significance, beneficiaries must have the ability to export 
products that enjoy preferential access. However, major preference granting schemes 
(e.g. GSP) may exclude products in which developing countries have a good comparative 
advantage. Even where countries get duty-free access on all goods, several low-income 
countries just don't have the capacity to utilise preferences, either without productive facilities or 
the capacity to compete with the price advantage that preference confers on them, due to 
internal transactions and operating costs.5 Thus, preferences have little value for countries with 
no such capacity, and the benefits of preferential access may be concentrated in certain sectors 
where low income countries are able to produce at a level at, or nearing (and therefore aided by 
the tariff preference), international competitiveness (Hoekman and Prowse, 2005; Bureau et al., 
2019; UNCTAD, 2018). 
3. Change in UK’s MFN tariff structure: Potential Impact  
In accordance with the UK's exit from the EU at the end of January 2020, procedures are 
underway to chart the country's independent trade policy. These policies will apply once the 
transitional period (i.e. where the UK remains bound by the EU's trade policy) comes to an end. 
The UK must also aim to balance strategic trade objectives (i.e. future free trade 
agreements) with the dedication to developing nations to lower the prevalence of poverty 
through trade. Among the list of suggestions is an assessment of the impact on developing 
countries prior to the elimination of tariffs on goods not produced within the UK (UKTPO, 2020). 
In view of the historical diplomatic and economic links between the UK and many developing 
nations, one of their big concern is the change in their trading arrangements after Brexit. 
However, this period of change may also offer an opportunity to reorganise and improve existing 
policies hampering their trade with the UK (Mendez-Parra, 2016 and 2017; Vickers, 2019). 
                                                   
5 Also, as long as either importers and distributors or the transport and logistics sector have considerable market 
power, the terms of trade benefits of preferential tariff cuts will be collected (at least in part) by those 
intermediaries instead of by exporter countries, i.e. developing countries to whom the preferences were intended 
(see Hoekman and Prowse, 2005; Francois and Wooton, 2001; UNCTAD, 2018). 
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UK: MFN Policy (post- Brexit) Towards Developing Countries 
The characteristics of the post-Brexit relationship between the UK and the EU will 
influence the UK's trade policy towards developing countries. Typical provisions, such as 
the harmonisation of standards and regulatory procedures that may or may not form part of the 
agreement between the UK and the EU, may have an impact on the operation of value chains 
involving the UK, the EU and developing countries. Nevertheless, very little has been said in 
recent debates among diplomats, trade negotiators and scholars about how the UK's new 
trade policy tools can be designed to help developing countries trade more and contribute 
to their development. Some principles and specific tools ought to be clearly stated in the 
definition of trade policy, especially for developing countries (Mendez-Parra, 2016). 
Regarding the definition of its MFN tariff (i.e. the default tariff applied to any WTO 
member), the UK could aim to eliminate the existing tariff peaks. A uniform, ad-valorem and 
low tariff implemented across all products, for instance, allows some revenue to be collected and 
offers some negotiating power in the bargaining of future FTAs. Nevertheless, presuming that the 
UK inherits the EU WTO timetables, this type of tariff structure will be impossible to implement 
(Bartels, 2016). In order to change this, the UK will have to start negotiating the inherited 
timetable with all WTO members. As a result, the new MFN tariff will have to be defined in the 
short term within the limits of the current schedules. Conversely, this does not deter the decrease 
of existing tariff peaks in agriculture, food and textile products (Mendez-Parra, 2016 and 2017). 
 
UK: Tariff Changes, Preference Erosion and Diplomatic Impacts 
In its contribution to the ‘GREAT Insights Magazine’, Mendez-Parra (2016) argued that 
preferences for developing countries should be based on a simple two-tier system: i) for 
LDCs and ii) some non-LDCs.6 For the LDCs, it is probable that the UK will apply an analogous 
regime to the existing EU EBA (i.e. duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) access for all LDCs in all 
products). Nevertheless, he notes that the UK should not skip the chance to improve up on the 
EBA. Common rules of origin with low domestic content thresholds and versatile rules on 
cumulation with other developing countries and UK FTA partners ought to be part of the system. 
Under the GSP, the UK, via the EU, gives preferences to many non-LDCs. The UK should 
replace the current two-tier system (GSP and GSP+) with a singular option of preferences. 
However, the preference system for non-LDC will be much less cordial than that for the 
LDCs (and this could likely lead to diplomatic complaints by some non-LDCs). Several key 
products for the least developed countries, such as sugar, cotton, tropical fruits and processed 
                                                   
6 Mendez-Parra (2016) argues that there are a number of guiding principles that should characterize the UK's 
trade policy, in particular towards developing countries. Trade policy should be simple, with its results tilted 
towards the least developed countries. The principle of preferences for all means that preferences should not 
apply to anyone, even though this may involve some cost to other developing countries. The UK may need to use 
Aid for Trade to offset the adverse effects to those countries affected by these policy changes. Complete 
coverage and simplicity also should apply to the definition of service preferences. Main products of the LDCs 
ought to be excluded from FTAs with certain emerging economies and extra LDC-friendly provisions should be 
implemented (Mendez-Parra, 2016). 
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products, must not be included in the offer for non-LDCs. Other labour-intensive items, such as 
some textiles, could also be omitted. In addition, a simple and transparent overall criterion (i.e. 
not based on products) must be applied to the benefit of both LDCs and small non-LDCs in order 
to exclude big and competitive developing countries. 
After Brexit, one of the primary objectives of the UK includes negotiating FTAs with non-
LDC countries (i.e. other developed and emerging economies such as China, India and 
Brazil). Trade talks with these countries are expected to be negotiated on the basis of more 
reciprocal principles. However, they could have an impact on trade from the LDCs (and other 
developing countries) because of extra competition (i.e. preference erosion) in the UK market on 
products that are also exported by the LDCs (Mendez-Parra, 2016 and 2017; Vickers, 2019). 
The magnitude of the economic effect (and the consequent diplomatic disputes involving 
the affected countries) depends on how similar the export structure of the LDCs and 
emerging economies to the UK is and on the UK's preference margin (Rollo et al, 2013). 
For example, the FTA with India may have significant effects on Bangladesh and Cambodia, as 
their exports to the UK are comparable to around 20% of the products (Mendez-Parra, 2016). 
Products that are in conflict with imports from the LDCs and where the margin of 
preference offered is high may need to be excluded from UK's forthcoming liberalisation 
of FTAs with emerging countries. In addition, the rules of origin of these FTAs ought to favour 
the integration of inputs from LDCs. Besides, if the mutual recognition of certification bodies is 
agreed, it should be extended to products originating in the LDCs. This may favour the creation 
of value chains involving the UK, its FTA partners and the LDCs (Mendez-Parra, 2016). 
 
4. Other Case Studies (Australia, EU, and the US) on 
Impact of MFN Tariff Changes 
Australia: MFN Policy Towards Developing Countries 
Australia is a much smaller player in world trade than major/bigger developed economies 
(such as the European Union, the United States and Japan). However, Australia is a key market 
for certain developing countries. Its preferential programs are particularly of regional importance 
(Lippoldt, 2006; Morgan, 2018; Rai, 2018).  
It is possible to categorize the non-reciprocal preferential tariff schemes of Australia in terms of 
trade flows, by order of their size (Lippoldt, 2006).  
 Among Australia's non-reciprocal preferential tariff measures, the tariff for 
developing countries is the widest preference with regards to the number of 
eligible economies and the total preferential imports into the country.  
 The next biggest non-reciprocal preference category by Australia consists of special 
rates for Asia's special economies. This category includes Hong Kong, China, the 
Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. However, Australia has signed ‘new’ 
reciprocal arrangements with some of these countries that used to export to the 
Australian market under “special rates”. For instance, an FTA with Singapore (which was 
 10 
 
 
 
effective since 2003) offered exporters in Singapore an enhanced or duty-free access to 
the Australian market.  
 The third-largest category involves the preference scheme for the Forum Island 
Countries (FICs). These preferences cover imports from a number of Pacific island 
economies and were implemented under the South Pacific Regional Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement (Lippoldt, 2006; Kautoke‐Holani, 2018). Papua 
New Guinea is a special case covered by the Agreement on Trade and Commercial 
Relations between Papua New Guinea and Australia. Papua New Guinea was eventually 
included among the beneficiaries of the FIC. even though total trade volumes are 
comparatively small under these preferences, they are very crucial to some of these 
economies. Imports under the scheme accounted for less than 1% of total Australian 
imports from developing countries over the 1996 to 2004 period (Lippoldt, 2006). 
Sugar and bananas are sensitive tropical items and source of many diplomatic disputes 
(e.g. the so called “banana wars”) between countries. For some examples of such disputes, 
see WTO (2018; 2013) and Annex section in this report. These items are, understandably, the 
most impacted by preference erosion (Lippoldt, 2006; Mercado, 2017; Rai, 2018; WTO, 
2013). Alexandraki and Lankes (2004) identify middle-income developing countries that are 
highly susceptible to export losses due to preference erosion (likely leading to diplomatic 
frictions). Alexandraki and Lankes (2004) estimate the effects of changes in the trade-weighted 
preference margins between developing countries concerned and the developed economies. 
They find that the vulnerability of developing countries to preference erosion is especially seen 
on sugar and banana exports (particularly to the European Union and U.S. markets). In several 
such cases, producers are small island economies (e.g. many small Pacific island states to 
whom Australia is a major export market) that may have significant challenges in adjusting to the 
erosion of preferences. They also find vulnerability to the preference erosion of textiles and 
clothing among middle-income countries, but to a far lesser degree than for sugar and bananas. 
Likewise, the Commonwealth Secretariat (2004) found that many preference-dependent 
economies (i.e. recipients of preferences for sugar, bananas, and textiles and clothing as well as 
beef) would suffer numerous economic woes in adjusting to a more liberalised trading 
environment (Lippoldt, 2006). 
Despite the availability of preferences for imports of sugar and bananas, the relative 
openness of the Australian MFN regime and the small import volumes imply that the 
negative impacts of erosion of Australian preferences in these areas are rather small. This 
reduces the potential for major diplomatic friction between the "preferred" and other 
countries. Australia seems to have a competitive domestic sugar and banana industry. It has a 
considerable production of bananas and is a major exporter of sugar. Though Australia has a 
relatively open trading regime for these products, the country's import volumes for both goods 
(as opposed to other developed countries) remains relatively low, both in terms of absolute 
volumes and export shares for exporters from developing countries. Imports are insignificant in 
the case of bananas. The effective preference margins of the developing countries are moderate, 
despite the availability of duty-free treatment for imports from the LDCs (Lippoldt, 2006). 
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Australia: Tariff Changes, Preference Erosion and Diplomatic 
Impacts 
Australia (like many other developed countries) has strengthened its trade preferences for 
LDCs over the years. Hoekman, Ng, and Olarreaga (2001) underline the diplomatic disputes 
liked to the deepening of preferences for the LDCs and the MFN-based liberalisation, with the 
benefit of the former being subverted by the latter. Preferential schemes may have significant 
direct impacts on specific beneficiaries, but much tends to depend on their supply-side capability, 
their ability to reinvest rents in a meaningful way, and the nature of administrative requirements 
(such as rules of origin). all in all, such limitations have restricted the actual benefit of 
preferences for many LDCs, leading Hoekman, Ng, and Olarreaga to imply that the erosion of 
current preferences should be of limited concern as a consequence of the liberalisation of the 
MFN. They note that one explanation as to why it has been possible to expand duty-free access 
for the LDCs is that they contribute to less than 0.5% of world trade (Lippoldt, 2006). 
Following the statement at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit on 25 
October 2002 by Australia’s foremost diplomat of the time (i.e. Prime Minister John 
Howard), the Australian Government revised the Customs Tariff to provide the LDCs with 
duty-free and quota-free access to the Australian market. The rules of origin for LDCs allow 
the use of materials from all developing countries, the FICs and Australia, to be counted as local 
content, except that the portion of non-LDC developing countries is limited to no more than 25% 
of the total manufacturing cost of the goods. The Australian Productivity Commission assessed 
the potential effects of this action in a report around the same time. The Commission referred to 
the generally limited flow of imports from the LDCs and noted that much of this flow had already 
been covered by the developing country and FIC preferences. In view of the pattern of trade and 
tariffs, the Commission concluded that the main impact on the LDCs was likely to come from 
Australian clothing imports, but that the ability of the LDCs to benefit would depend on their 
ability to offer an enabling environment for an efficient supply response. In a related paper, 
Zhang and Verikios (2003) assessed the possible effects of duty-free access on LDCs. They 
found that the LDCs would (on average) benefit from the policy change, particularly the major 
exporters of clothing (for example, Bangladesh and Cambodia). It has been estimated that the 
effects on suppliers from non-LDCs developing countries are moderate. They noted that some 
countries competing with LDCs (such as China) may not lose out in the policy change since they 
could increase their exports of intermediate inputs to LDCs (Lippoldt, 2006). 
Exports from developing countries to Australia are consistently treated, with relatively 
high preferential margins granted to developing countries in South and East Asia, Latin 
America, and Africa. Other exceptions include Brazil, South Africa, Thailand, and Vietnam. On 
average, these countries face hurdles higher than those faced by other trading partners, partly 
due to the composition of their exports to Australia. In some cases, such as in the case of the 
FICs, the benefits from enhanced market access under unilateral liberalisation appear to be more 
than offsetting the losses resulting from the erosion of preferences (Lippoldt, 2006). 
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EU: MFN Policy Towards Developing Countries 
The EU is by far the biggest contributor to the spread of trade agreements worldwide. The 
origins of this proliferation of trade agreements in the political economy lie in three factors: the 
heterogeneity of the EU; the particular role played by its trade policy; and the fierce (diplomatic 
and economic) demands from its trading partners (Candau and Jean, 2009; Mahrenbach and 
Shaw, 2019). 
There are two main types of trade agreements: free trade agreements and non-reciprocal 
schemes.7 Free trade agreements are bilaterally negotiated on reciprocal obligations between 
the parties, while non-reciprocal schemes are unilaterally given by the EU to developing 
countries (Heron, 2019; WTO, 2018). Free trade agreements are designed as a tool for regional 
economic integration, with a legal basis in the multilateral domain under Article XXIV of the GATT 
(Bartels, 2016; VanGrasstek, 2013). Non-reciprocal agreements give more favourable treatment 
to developing countries (under the enabling clause or via specific WTO waivers). The non-
contractual character of a number of non-reciprocal schemes (and the GSP in particular) also 
involves uncertainty regarding their future (with the exception of the EBA initiative) since they can 
be unilaterally modified (Candau and Jean 2009). 
The most inclusive of EU’s trade agreements with developing countries is the GSP, which 
gives non-reciprocal, preferential access to a wide range of products, albeit with a restricted 
preferential margin for so-called (politically and economically) 'sensitive' products. The GSP is 
also transitory and subject to periodic updates. Graduation measures (i.e. the exclusion of some 
or all goods from the system) are taken where beneficiary states may have achieved a level of 
competitiveness in particular sectors that guarantees further growth even in the absence 
of preferential access to the EU market (EC, 2020; Candau and Jean, 2009). The GSP is linked 
to fairly strict rules of origin. In the past, drug-fighting countries have been given a special and 
more advantageous regime. In 2001, this regime concerned only the countries of the Central 
American and Andean Pact. The updated GSP amended this approach and gave very gracious 
preferences to countries that prove a commitment to sustainable development by ratifying crucial 
international treaties and conventions (Candau and Jean, 2009). 
Furthermore, as from March 2001, EU’s EBA initiative gave duty-free, quota-free access to 
LDCs for all products except arms, with delayed implementation for sugar, rice and 
bananas. even though it is part of the GSP scheme (and therefore associated with the same 
general rules), the EBA is not limited by any restriction on duration, coverage, or protection 
measures. (2009, Candau and Jean; Mendez-Parra, 2017) 
The other types of trade agreements of the EU involve a number of bilateral and regional 
agreements (such as those with Chile, South Africa and the Mediterranean countries) that 
give deeper preferences than those to which the GSP countries would have been entitled. The 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement, that built on from the former Lomé Conventions, and later led to 
the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and ACP countries is especially 
                                                   
7 EU's numerous trade agreements can be classed into a few categories. The first set includes close, 
neighbourhood, reciprocal agreements within Europe, which include agreements with the European Free Trade 
Association, bilateral free trade agreements with Central and Eastern European countries, and a few additional 
bilateral agreements (Candau and Jean, 2009). The rest of the trade agreements are for developing countries. 
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remarkable. EPAs aim to promote the ‘smooth and gradual’ inclusion of ACP countries into the 
world economy and eventually realize sustainable development and poverty reduction via trade 
and investment (EC, 2018).8 These non-reciprocal agreements give the majority of ACP products 
duty-free access to the EU market (and also crucial preferential tariff quotas) and is highly 
pertinent to the benefit of developing countries (Candau and Jean 2009; Van Biesebroeck and 
Zaurino, 2019; Mendez-Parra et al., 2016). The Cotonou Agreement allows for full cumulation, 
taking all operations carried out in the participating countries at the time of origin into 
consideration. This provision is much more liberal than the GSP rules of origin, which only allow 
for bilateral or diagonal cumulation (Candau and Jean 2009). 
As compared to other developed markets (e.g. Canada, Japan, and the United States), the 
EU seems to provide a fairly high preferential margin to developing countries. This benefit 
is particularly clear to LDCs who face nearly zero ad valorem equivalent (AVE) protection, 
as a result of the EBA initiative. For non-LDCs, the average preferential margin on the EU 
market is limited but still better than that accessible on other markets (i.e. Canada, Japan and the 
United States). In manufacturing, protection is generally low. However, for developing countries, 
it is practically zero for products other than textiles and clothing. In such cases, there is no 
significant preferential margin for non-LDCs (Candau and Jean 2009). 
The case of agricultural products (exported by developing countries to 
the European market) is particularly relevant, given both the high level of trade barriers in 
this sector and the immense significance of these products to exports from developing 
countries (Candau and Jean, 2009; Bureau et al, 2019; WTO, 2013). Developing countries 
(especially the LDCs) accounted for a much larger share of agricultural imports into the EU than 
they do in other major developed markets (Candau and Jean, 2009). 
 
EU: Tariff Changes, Preference Erosion and Diplomatic Impacts 
The EU is by far the biggest market for agricultural exports in developing countries – and it is 
particularly important for most former colonies of European states. The EU's trade preferences 
are, therefore, important from the perspective of development. Diplomats and trade 
ministers of the African Union Member States had long recognised this. The diplomats and 
trade negotiators have repeatedly expressed their concern about the erosion of 
preferences. These worries were, for instance, reflected in the specific provisions of the draft 
modalities for market access liberalisation in the Doha Round (WTO, 2008; Candau and Jean, 
2009). 
                                                   
8 “…EPAs have sustainable development as a key objective. In that regard, an explicit reference is made in EPAs 
to the commitments set out in the Cotonou Agreement, especially the general commitment to economic 
development and reducing poverty in a way that is consistent with the objectives of sustainable development. 
EPAs are explicitly based on the "essential and fundamental" elements set out in the Cotonou Agreement, i.e. 
human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law, and good governance….” (EC, 2018. p 2) 
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Preferential trade arrangements, whether they are reciprocal or not, play an important role in 
shaping trade opportunities for many developing countries, particularly the poorest.9 They are 
particularly important for sub-Saharan African countries, given the non-reciprocal 
preferences given, especially through the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (Candau and 
Jean 2009; Mendez-Parra et al., 2016; Van Biesebroeck and Zaurino, 2019). The prospect of 
multilateral liberalisation, therefore, raises major concerns about the erosion of these preferences 
and the potential ramifications of such erosion (Bouët, Fontagné and Jean 2006; Candau and 
Jean 2009). 
By combining deep preferences, broad coverage and relatively flexible rules, the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement had been instrumental for African exporters. The end of this 
agreement in 2008 was, therefore, a landmark in the trade relationship between sub-Saharan 
African countries and the EU and finding an acceptable transition from this regime was a major 
issue. The negotiations among diplomats and the partnership agreements signed or bargained 
with the EU were a way out for most countries, even if their reciprocity required widespread 
liberalisation of imports from the EU in return by these countries. In this context, the EBA 
initiative was a good alternative for the sub-Saharan African LDCs. Given the specialisation of 
those countries in raw agricultural products, most of which are manufactured using only a few 
traded intermediates and therefore do not interfere with the rules of origin. For other developing 
countries, the EU GSP appears to be a very poor substitute (Candau and Jean, 2009). 
 
USA: MFN Policy Towards Developing Countries 
The GSP in the U.S., which is provided to many developing countries, is duty-free and 
covers most dutiable and semi-processed products and selected agricultural, fishery and 
primary industrial goods that are not otherwise duty-free. However, compared to other 
U.S. preferential programs, the GSP covers fewer products. Products deemed to be 
sensitive to importation are excluded by law. Agricultural products which are subject to a tariff-
rate quota are not eligible for duty-free access in any quantity which exceeds that quota. Other 
ineligible products include most textiles, clothing, watches, footwear, handbags, luggage, work 
gloves and other clothing made of leather in whole or in part. The GSP has additional limitations, 
including periodic expiry, loss of GSP eligibility due to automatic graduation to the World Bank's 
high-income country category, and loss of GSP eligibility for a particular product once the 
competitive requirements have been exceeded (Dean and Wainio, 2006; Mendez-Parra, 2017; 
Blanchard and Hakobyan, 2015). 
The U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) provided duty-free status to more 
than 6,400 imported goods from sub-Saharan African countries as part of the Trade Act 
2000 (USITC, 2004a; Van Biesebroeck and Zaurino, 2019). This is a much larger set of goods 
than that covered by the GSP. In the case of non-LDC countries, products are eligible for 
preferences under AGOA or GSP, but not under both. Nevertheless, some products are eligible 
                                                   
9 The EU plays a key role in the export of developing countries, not only because of the size of its market but also 
because of its various reciprocal and non-reciprocal preferential agreements. Dependence on EU preferences is 
particularly important for some African and Caribbean countries. On average, the use of these tariff preferences 
has been shown to be strong (Candau and Jean 2009). 
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for both programs for the LDC beneficiaries. AGOA exempts beneficiaries from the limits of 
competitive needs. The program also provides duty-free and quota-free access to clothing made 
from U.S. fabric, yarn and thread in eligible sub-Saharan African countries. Imports of apparel 
made from regional fabrics were subject to a cap, which was intended to grow over a period of 
eight years. Furthermore, the Special Apparel Rule (SRA) permitted the LDCs to have duty-free 
access to apparel made from fabrics originating in third countries. AGOA II (part of the 2002 
Trade Act) widened preferential access and increased the regional clothing cap, while AGOA III 
(2004) extended the program until 2015 (Dean and Wainio, 2006; Van Biesebroeck and Zaurino, 
2019). 
The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) is a program that eliminates or 
reduces tariffs on eligible imported goods from designated Caribbean and Central 
American countries and territories (USITC, 2005; Dean and Wainio, 2006; VanGrasstek, 2013). 
Further, the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), an extension of CBERA. Under 
the CBTPA, a number of import-sensitive products have become eligible for preferential duty 
treatment, including apparel, petroleum and petroleum products. CBTPA grants unrestricted 
duty-free entry for imports of garments manufactured in CBERA countries from fabrics made and 
cut in the United States of American yarns. CBTPA also offers some preferential access to 
clothing made from regional fabric, however, unlike AGOA, it does not have a third-country fabric 
provision (Dean and Wainio, 2006; UNCTAD, 2016). 
The Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) granted duty-free access to a large number of 
import items from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru since the early 1990s (USITC, 
2004b). ATPA covers more products than GSP, and eligibility is not limited to the limits of the 
GSP's competitive needs or the possibility of graduation. ATPA preferential treatment was 
extended in 2002 to include previously excluded import-sensitive products such as petroleum 
and petroleum derivatives, clothing and textiles, footwear, and tuna in foil packages. ATPA 
allows unlimited duty-free and quota-free treatment for imports of textiles and clothing made in 
ATPA countries using yarn, fabric or fabric components made entirely in the United States. Like 
the CBTPA, ATPA also provides some preferential access for clothing made from regional fabric, 
but no provision for third-country fabric (Dean and Wainio, 2006; UNCTAD, 2016). 
 
USA: Tariff Changes, Preference Erosion and Diplomatic Impacts 
There has been a great deal of diplomatic friction and debate over the value of preferential 
trade programs offered by the US (i.e. like other major industrial countries), giving duty-
free or reduced-duty access to many exports from developing countries. Some diplomats 
from developing countries and non-governmental organisations asserted that the erosion of 
preferences would have dire implications for development and would require compensation (e.g. 
Alpert, 2005). Similarly, other diplomats and trade experts asserted that the vulnerability to 
preferential erosion is limited to only a few countries and products and therefore requires more 
targeted assistance (WTO 2004; Dean and Wainio 2006; WTO, 2018). 
Compensation for the erosion of preferences, higher food import costs, and adjustments 
to implementation have been promised by US diplomats (as well as other preference-
giving countries) in various trade negotiations/rounds (FAO, 2020; Alpert, 2005; Heron, 
2019). The LDCs were often promised substantially increased financial and technical assistance 
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necessary to enable them to respond appropriately to any new measures. Nevertheless, the 
delivery of these promises has been historically negligible. Conversely, the Doha Round was 
dubbed 'the Development Round' by the diplomats of the US and other rich countries (i.e. to 
reflect the commitments of all members to integrate poor countries into the multilateral trading 
system). Members agreed that the new round would address the development dimension of 
trade. The Round also focused on the different array of concerns raised by the diplomats and 
trade negotiators of developing countries – e.g. special and differential treatment, trade 
facilitation assistance, challenges faced by net food imports from developing countries, and loss 
of preference erosion (Alpert, 2005; FAO, 2020; Heron, 2019). 
Many diplomats of developing countries stress that they will not be able to benefit from 
new trade rules, even with special and differential treatment, without additional trade-
related support. Statements by the LDC Trade Ministers at the Doha Round recall the 
commitments made by the international community (e.g. at negotiations in Marrakech, 
Singapore, Geneva and Brussels) to help the LDCs, and call on all WTO members to offer trade 
assistance (Alpert, 2005; UNCTAD, 2018; Heron, 2019). However, despite the insistence of 
LDCs diplomats (i.e. on the need for special consideration and extra support), their proposals 
have been (historically) firmly challenged. Rich countries have been questioning the need for 
specific solutions to the erosion, implementation and other development interests outlined by the 
LDC diplomats – even during the Doha (or “Development”) Round. While the framework 
agreement of July 2004 tried to address these issues, it merely states that 'development issues 
should be taken into consideration.' Unless these claims are taken seriously, many developing 
country diplomats see little value in trade rounds and negotiations. For instance, of the 80 
proposals put forward by diplomats of developing countries for special and differential treatment 
in the Doha Round, more than half requested assistance to address adjustment costs, capacity 
building needs, and the impact of preferential erosion and liberalisation. Nevertheless, promises 
made by developed members amounted to little more than a ‘positive diplomatic language’, as 
rich countries continue to raise different objections to the demands of LDC diplomats (Alpert, 
2005). 
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6. Annexe: Historical Examples of MFN tariff Disputes 
1. Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and United States 
vs. EC (Bananas) 
 
 PARTIES AGREEMENTS TIMELINE OF THE DISPUTE 
Complainants Ecuador, Guatemala,  
Honduras, Mexico,  
United States 
GATT Arts. I, III, X, 
XIII 
GATS Arts. II, XVII 
Licensing Ag Art. 1.3 
Lomé Waiver 
Establishment of Panel 8 May 1996 
Circulation of Panel 
Report 
22 May 1997 
Respondent European 
Communities 
Circulation of AB Report 9 September 1997 
Adoption 25 September 
1997 
Source: WTO (2018, 2013) 
 
• Measure at issue: The European Communities' regime for the import, distribution and sale of 
bananas was introduced on 1 July 1993 and created by EEC Council Regulation 404/93 
(WTO, 2018; 2013). 
 
• Product at issue: Bananas that are imported from third countries. Third countries are those 
countries other than (i) 12 African, Caribbean and Pacific (“ACP”) countries who have 
traditionally exported bananas to the European Communities and (ii) ACP countries that were 
not traditional suppliers of the EC market (WTO, 2018; 2013). 
 
• Summary of key findings: 
▪ GATT Art. I (most-favoured-nation treatment): WTO’s Appellate Body10 endorsed 
the WTO Panel's finding that the activity function rules, which was valid only to 
licence allocation rules for imports from other than traditional ACP countries, were not 
consistent with MFN treatment (WTO, 2018; 2013). 
▪ WTO’s Appellate Body also agreed with the WTO Panel that the EC export certificate 
requirement afforded a benefit to some Members only, i.e. the Framework Agreement 
on Bananas (BFA) countries, in violation of MFN treatment. In an issue not appealed 
to WTO’s Appellate Body, the WTO Panel discovered that tariff preferences for ACP 
countries were not consistent with MFN treatment, but that they were warranted by 
the Lomé Waiver (WTO, 2018; 2013). 
 
2. Ecuador vs. EC (Bananas) 
 
 PARTIES AGREEMENTS TIMELINE OF THE DISPUTE 
Complainant Ecuador GATT Arts. I and XIII 
GATS Arts. II and 
XVII 
Referred to the Original 
Panel 
12 January 
1999 
Circulation of Panel Report 12 April 1999 
                                                   
10 WTO’s Appellate Body “is composed of seven Members who are appointed by the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB). Each Member of the Appellate Body is required to be a person of recognized authority, with demonstrated 
expertise in law, international trade and the subject-matter of the covered agreements generally. They are also 
required to be unaffiliated with any government and are to be broadly representative of the Membership of the 
WTO.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_bio_e.htm 
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Respondent European 
Communities 
Circulation of AB Report NA 
Adoption 6 May 1999 
Source: WTO (2018, 2013) 
 
• Measure taken to comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings: EC Regulation No. 
1637/98 which was implemented to modify Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 – the measure at 
issue in the original dispute – together with EC Regulation No. 2362/98, which set forth 
implementing rules for the revised Regulation. The Regulation related to the imports of bananas 
into the European Communities and access to the EC market for three types of bananas (WTO, 
2018; 2013). 
 
• Summary of key findings: 
▪ GATT Art. I:1 (most-favoured-nation treatment): The WTO panel found that a more 
favourable quota level for ACP countries was a prerequisite under the Lomé 
Convention. Nevertheless, it found that there was a breach of MFN treatment in the 
collective distribution of quotas to ACP countries, calculated on the basis of the best-
ever export volume of individual countries prior to 1991, which could have resulted in 
some countries exporting more than their best-ever export volume prior to 1991, which 
would not have been justified under the Lomé Waiver. As regards the preferential zero 
tariff for imports from non-traditional ACP countries, the WTO panel found no 
infringement as the Lomé Convention allows the European Communities to grant 
preferential treatment to ACP countries as well as discretion as to the form of such 
preferential treatment (WTO, 2018; 2013). 
 
3. Ecuador and the United States vs. EC (Bananas)11 
 
PARTIES AGREEMENT TIMELINE OF THE DISPUTE 
Complainants Ecuador, 
United 
States 
GATT Arts. I, II 2 
and XIII 
DSU Art. 21.5 
Referred to the 
Original Panels 
20 March 2007 (Ecuador) 12 July 
2007 (United States) 
Circulation of Panel 
Reports 
7 April 2008 (Ecuador) 
19 May 2008 (United States) 
Respondent European  
Communities 
Circulation of AB 
Reports 
26 November 2008 
Adoption 11 December 2008 (Ecuador) 
22 December 2008 (United States) 
Source: WTO (2018, 2013) 
 
• MEASURE TAKEN TO COMPLY WITH THE DSB RECOMMENDATIONS AND RULINGS: 
Import regime for bananas from the European Communities, as provided by EC Regulation No 
1964/2005 of 24 November 2005. The constitutes a duty-free quota of 775,000 mt for bananas 
from ACP countries and a tariff rate of 176/mt for all other bananas imported (WTO, 2018; 
2013). 
 
• Summary of key findings: 
                                                   
11 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse 
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador; and European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale 
and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States 2 Art. II was 
invoked only by Ecuador. 
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▪ GATT Art I (most-favoured-nation treatment): In an issue not referred to the WTO 
Appellate Body, both panels found that the preference given by the European 
Communities to an annual duty-free tariff quota of 775,000 mt of imported bananas 
originating in ACP countries constituted a benefit not granted to bananas originating in 
non-ACP WTO members and thus was inconsistent with MFN treatment. The WTO 
Panel also found that the European Communities had not demonstrated the existence 
of an exemption from MFN treatment for the period following the expiration of the Doha 
Waiver to cover the preference granted by the European Communities to ACP banana 
duty-free tariff quotas (WTO, 2018; 2013). 
 
4. India vs. EC (tariff preferences on imports from India)12 
 
 PARTIES AGREEMENT TIMELINE OF THE DISPUTE 
Complainant India GATT Art. I.1 
Enabling Clause para. 
2(a) 
Establishment of Panel 27 January 2003 
Circulation of Panel 
Report 
1 December 
2003 
Respondent European 
Communities 
Circulation of AB Report 7 April 2004 
Adoption 20 April 2004 
Source: WTO (2018, 2013) 
 
• Measure at issue: European Communities' generalised tariff preferences (“GSP”) system for 
developing countries and economies in transition. Specifically, special arrangement under the 
scheme to combat drug production and trafficking (the “Drug Arrangements”), the benefits of 
which apply only to the listed 12 countries experiencing a certain gravity of drug problems.13 
• Product at issue: Products imported from India vs products imported from the 12 countries 
benefiting from the Drug Arrangements through the EC GSP scheme (WTO, 2018; 2013). 
 
• Summary of key findings: 
▪ GATT Art. I:1 (most-favoured-nation treatment): The WTO panel noted that the tariff 
advantages under the Drug Arrangements were not consistent with the treatment of 
MFN, as the tariff advantages were granted only to products originating in the 12 
beneficiary countries and not to similar products originating in all other Member States, 
including those originating in India (WTO, 2018). 
▪ Enabling Clause, para. 2(a):  WTO’s Appellate Body reached an agreement with the 
WTO Panel that the Enabling Clause is an “exception” to GATT MFN treatment, and 
concluded that the Drug Arrangements were not justified under para. 2(a) of the 
Enabling Clause, as the measure, inter alia, did not set forth any objective criteria, that, 
if met, would permit for other developing countries “that are similarly affected by the 
drug problem” to be incorporated as beneficiaries under the measure. In this respect, 
even if upholding the WTO Panel's conclusion, WTO’s Appellate Body conflicted with 
the WTO Panel's logic and found that not every difference in tariff treatment of GSP 
beneficiaries inevitably constituted discriminatory treatment. Awarding different tariff 
preferences to products originating in different GSP beneficiaries is permitted under 
                                                   
12 European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries 
13 The 12 countries benefiting from the Drug Arrangements are the following: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru and 
Venezuela. 
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the term 'non-discriminatory' in footnote 3 to para. 2, given that the relevant tariff 
preferences react positively to a particular “development, financial or trade need” and 
have been made available on the basis of an objective standard to “all beneficiaries 
that share that need” (WTO, 2018). 
▪ Burden of proof (Enabling Clause): WTO’s Appellate Body stated that, as a general 
principle, the responsibility of proof for an “exception” falls on the respondent. Given 
“the vital role played by the Enabling Clause in the WTO system as means of 
stimulating economic growth and development”, nevertheless, when a measure taken 
pursuant to the Enabling Clause is contested, a complaining party must claim more 
than mere inconsistency with MFN treatment and must point to specific provisions of 
the Enabling Clause with which the scheme is supposedly inconsistent so as to define 
the parameters within which the responding party must prepare its response under the 
requirements of the Enabling Clause. WTO’s Appellate Body discovered that India in 
this case sufficiently raised para. 2(a) of the Enabling Clause in making its claim of 
inconsistency with GATT MFN treatment (WTO, 2018). 
 
5. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras vs. the 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (Polypropylene bags and tubular 
fabric)14 
 
 PARTIES AGREEMENT TIMELINE OF THE DISPUTE 
Complainants Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras 
GATT Arts. I:1, II:1(b), 
XIX:1(a), XIX:2 and XIX 
SA Arts. 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 4.1(a), 
4.1(c),  
4.2(a), 4.2(c), 4.2, 6, 9.1 and 
11.1(a) 
Establishment of 
Panel 
7 February 
2011 
Circulation of Panel 
Report 
31 January 
2012 
Respondent Dominican Republic Circulation of AB 
Report 
NA 
Adoption 22 February 
2012 
Source: WTO (2018, 2013) 
 
• Measure at issue: The provisional and final protection measures enforced by the Dominican 
Republic on imports, and the investigation that led to the imposition of those measures. 
• Product at issue: Polypropylene bags and tubular fabric (WTO, 2018; 2013). 
• Summary of key findings: 
▪ GATT Arts. I:1 (most-favoured-nation treatment) and II:1(b) (schedules of 
concessions – other duties or charges): The WTO Panel decided that the measures 
at issue had the consequence of suspending the Dominican Republic’s most-favoured-
nation treatment responsibility in MFN treatment, as well as the exclusion on other 
duties or charges in connection with importation within the meaning of Art. II:1(b) 
(WTO, 2018; 2013). 
  
                                                   
14 Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Polypropylene Bags and Tubular Fabric 
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6. Philippines vs. Brazil (Desiccated Coconut)15 
 
 PARTIES AGREEMENTS TIMELINE OF THE DISPUTE 
Complainant Philippines GATT Arts. I, II and VI AA 
Art. 13 
Establishment of Panel 5 March 1996 
Circulation of Panel 
Report 
17 October 
1996 
Respondent Brazil Circulation of AB Report 21 February 
1997 
Adoption 20 March 1997 
Source: WTO (2018, 2013) 
 
• Measure at issue: A countervailing duty Brazil imposed on 18 August 1995 on the basis of an 
investigation started on 21 June 1994. 
• Product at issue: Desiccated coconut and coconut milk imported from the Philippines. 
• Summary of key panel/ab findings:  
▪ GATT Arts. I (most-favoured-nation treatment), II (schedules of 
concessions) and VI (anti-dumping and countervailing duties): WTO’s Appellate 
Body upheld the WTO Panel's finding that GATT Arts. I, II and VI did not apply to the 
Brazilian countervailing duty measure at issue for the reason that it was centred on an 
investigation initiated prior to 1 January 1995, the date that the WTO Agreement came 
into effect for Brazil. In particular, the WTO Panel found: (i) the subsidy rules in the 
GATT cannot apply separately of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (ASCM); and (ii) non-application of the ASCM makes the subsidy rules in 
the GATT non-applicable. As for GATT Arts. I and II, they did not apply to this 
disagreement since the claims under these provisions derived from the claims of 
inconsistency with Art. VI (WTO, 2018; 2013). 
 
7. Indonesia vs. European Communities, Japan, United States 
(Autos)16 
 
 PARTIES AGREEMENTS TIMELINE OF THE DISPUTE 
Complainants European Communities, Japan, 
United States 
TRIMs Art. 2.1 
GATT Arts. I:1 and III:2 
ASCM Arts. 5(c), 6, 27.9 
and 28 
Establishment of 
Panel 
12 June 
1997 
Circulation of Panel 
Report 
2 July 
1998 
Respondent Indonesia Circulation of AB 
Report 
NA 
Adoption 23 July 
1998 
Source: WTO (2018, 2013) 
 
• Measure at issue: (i) “The 1993 Programme” that delivered import duty reductions or 
exemptions on imports of automotive parts on the basis of the local content percent; and (ii) 
“The 1996 National Car Programme” that delivered various benefits such as luxury tax 
                                                   
15 Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut 
16 Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry 
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exemption or import duty exemption to qualifying (local content and etc.) cars or Indonesian car 
companies (WTO, 2018; 2013). 
• Product at issue: Imported motor vehicles and parts. 
• Summary of key panel findings 
▪ GATT Art I (most-favoured-nation treatment): The WTO Panel agreed that the 
measures violated MFN treatment since the “advantages” (duty and sales tax 
exemptions) given to Korean imports were not afforded “unconditionally” to “like” 
products from other Members (WTO, 2018; 2013). 
 
8. Chile vs. Argentina (Price Band System)17 
 
PARTIES AGREEMENTS TIMELINE OF THE DISPUTE 
Complainant Argentina AA Art. 4.2 
GATT Art. II:1(b), second sentence 
WTO Agreement Art. XVI:4 
Referred to the Original Panel 20 January 2006 
Circulation of Panel Report 8 December 2006 
Respondent Chile Circulation of AB Report 7 May 2007 
Adoption 22 May 2007 
Source: WTO (2018, 2013) 
 
• Measure taken to comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings: The revised price 
band system applied by Chile, through which the total amount of duties applied on imports of 
wheat, wheat flour and sugar would fluctuate, through the imposition of extra specific duties or 
through the concession of rebates on the amounts payable. When the reference price 
established by the Chilean authorities dropped below the lower threshold of a price band, a 
specific duty was included to the ad valorem most-favoured-nation tariff. On the other hand, 
when the reference price was greater than the upper threshold of the price band, imports would 
benefit from a duty rebate (WTO, 2018; 2013). 
 
9. Turkey vs. United States (Rice)18 
 
 PARTIES AGREEMENTS TIMELINE OF THE DISPUTE 
Complainant United 
States 
GATT Arts. III:4, X:1, X:2, XI:1 
AA Art. 4.2 
Licensing Ag Arts. 1.4(a), 1.4(b),  
1.6, 3.5(a), 3.5(e), 3.5(f), 3.5(h), 
5.1,  
5.2(a), 5.2(b), 5.2(c), 5.2(d), 
5.2(e),  
5.2(g), 5.2(h), 5.41 
TRIMs Art. 2.1 and para1(a) of the  
Annex 
Establishment of Panel 17 March 2006 
Circulation of Panel 
Report 
21 September 
2007 
Respondent Turkey Circulation of AB Report NA 
Adoption 22 October 2007 
Source: WTO (2018, 2013) 
 
                                                   
17 Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products – 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Argentina 
18 Turkey – Measures Affecting the Importation of Rice 
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• Measure at issue: Turkey's limits on the importation of rice, specifically: (i) the decision, during 
particular periods of time commencing September 2003 to refuse or fail to grant Certificates of 
Control to import rice at the most-favoured-nation tariff rates; (ii) the domestic buying 
condition incorporated in Turkey's TRQ regime (until July 2006), to import rice at lesser tariff 
rates; (iii) the discouragement of the full use of tariff-rate quotas via their administration; (iv) the 
collective effect of measures (i) and (iii); and (v) Turkey's administration of its import regime for 
rice, more broadly (WTO, 2018; 2013). 
• Product at issue: Rice, including paddy, husked and white rice, imported by Turkey. 
• Summary of key findings: 
▪ AA Art. 4.2 (quantitative restrictions): The WTO Panel noted that Turkey had 
refused or failed to grant licences to import rice at the most-favoured-nation tariff 
rates, i.e. beyond the tariff rate quotas. The WTO Panel found this practice to be a 
quantitative import restriction and discretionary import licensing, within the meaning of 
footnote 1 to Art. 4.2 (WTO, 2018).19 
 
10. Panama vs. Colombia (textile, apparel and footwear 
imports)20 
 
 PARTIES AGREEMENT TIMELINE OF THE DISPUTE 
Complainant Panama GATT Arts. XI:1, XIII:1, V:2 V:6 and I:1 
CVA Arts. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 
Establishment of Panel 22 October 2007 
Circulation of Panel Report 27 April 2009 
Respondent Colombia Circulation of AB Report NA 
Adoption 20 May 2009 
Source: WTO (2018, 2013) 
 
• Measure at issue: Colombian customs rule about the use of indicative prices and restrictions 
on ports of entry. 
• Product at issue: some textiles, apparel and footwear classifiable under HS Chapters 50-64 
of Colombia's Tariff Schedule, which were re-exported and re-exported from the Colon Free 
Zone (“CFZ”) and Panama to Colombia (WTO, 2018). 
• Summary of key findings: 
▪ GATT Art. I:1 (most-favoured-nation treatment): The WTO Panel noted that, by 
requiring textile, apparel and footwear imports coming from Panama and the CFZ to 
an advance import declaration obligation, which thus involves payment of customs 
duties and sales tax beforehand and thwarts importers from examining goods on-site 
upon arrival so as to verify the accuracy of the declaration, Colombia conferred 
advantages to like products from all other WTO Members that were not given 
immediately and unconditionally to textile, apparel and footwear imports from Panama 
and the CFZ in violation of Art. I.1 (WTO, 2018). 
 
 
                                                   
19 In making this finding, the WTO Panel did not consider it necessary to assess whether the relevant 
Turkish documents constituted import licences as argued by the United States. 
20 Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry 
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